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NEGLIGENT BEHAVIOR SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM
PENAL LIABILITYt
JEROME HALL*
The adoption of the Model Penal Code' by the American Law Institute
raises the question, long a subject of discussion among legal commentators,
of the justification of punishing persons who negligently damage social
values. In this writer's judgment, it would be a great step forward to exclude
negligent behavior from the scope of penal liability. The Model Penal Code
holds otherwise.

I.

THE MODEL PENAL CODE'S APPROACH TO NEGLIGENCE

The Code differentiates the requirements of what is there called "culpability" necessary to convict a person, by reference to whether he "acts"
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. 2 It provides:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element
of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of
his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross

t The subject of this paper is more fully discussed in a book by the author, GENEAL
PRINciPLEs OF CRImNAL LAW (2d ed. 1960), but certain additional matters are here
treated in the light of comparative discussions in the author's seminar conducted at
the University of Freiburg in 1961. The substance of this paper was presented at the
meeting of the Association Internationale de Droit Pinal in Lisbon on -September 22,
1961.
* Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. The Model Penal Code is hereinafter cited as MPC. Unless otherwise indicated,
all citations are to the 1962 Official Draft.
2. See MPC § 2.02(2).
The meaning of "negligence" is confused in the Model Penal Code by the failure
to employ well-known legal terms and by the ambiguous use of other terms by reference
to which "negligence" must be defined. For example, "intentionally" is not used but
"purposely" is employed to define the first and, presumably, the most serious type of
"culpability." It is stated: "A broader distinction is perceived between acting either
purposely or knowingly and acting recklessly." MPC § 2.02, comment 3 at 125 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955). But a reckless person acts "purposely" with regard to "an action
of that nature," e.g., he purposely accelerates the speed of his automobile. It is also
stated that "intentionally . . . means purposely." MPC § 1.13(12). But again, the
difference between intentional harm-doing and reckless harm-doing is not stated. These
doubts involving "negligence" are increased by "the circumstances known to him" and
by the statement that "a prior voluntary act, such as the act of driving, or a prior omission,
such as failing to stop as he felt illness approaching, may, under given circumstances, be
regarded as sufficiently negligent for liability to be imposed." MPC § 2.01, comment 2 at
120 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). (Emphasis added.)
Troublesome questions regarding other relevant terms cannot be discussed here.
But attention must be called to the unfortunate use of "act" to include both voluntary and
involuntary movements, MPC § 1.13(2), the consequent failure to distinguish conduct
from behavior, MPC § 1.13(5), and the pejorative listing of negligence as a type of
criminal culpability. MPC § 2.02(2) (d). On the above questions see HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPrLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1960).

NEGLIGENT BEHAVIOR
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor's situation.3
Unlike current statutory formulations, 4 the first sentence of the above
provision does not state that the "act" is inadvertent; hence, it is possible
to argue that if the "actor" "should be aware" and so on, he was, as a normal
person, in fact, aware. The second sentence may be thought to cure the
omission but this is complicated by the requirement of "gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation." "Gross deviation" is also employed in the Code's provision on
recklessness, and "gross" in conjunction with "negligence" has been very
frequently interpreted in judicial decisions to mean "recklessness." The
question regarding the defendant's state of mind is further complicated by
the fact that ordinary negligence, the subject of tort liability, does not require
a gross deviation.5 One is left uncertain whether ordinary civil negligence
is intended or whether a new species of "negligence" is proposed. For the
purpose of this discussion, however, it will be assumed that the Code penalizes
ordinary negligence, as that is understood in the law of torts.
Negligent behavior is not culpable, under the Code, unless the definition
of the crime so indicates. 6 It is criminal if the defendant's negligence results
in homicide7 or bodily injury with a deadly weapon,8 and it is a noncriminal
"violation" if it results in damage to property by fire, explosives, or other
dangerous means. 9 The reasons for restricting the penal liability of negligent
persons to the instances noted above are not, to the writer's knowledge,
discussed by the draftsmen of the Code.' 0
3. MPC § 2.02(2) (d).
4. Negligence is defined in § 3(1) of the New York Penal Law as "a want of
such attention to the nature or probable consequences of the act or omission as a
prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns . . . ." Other state statutes
adhere to this formulation. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1-215 (Supp. 1962);
CAL. PEN. CODE § 7; IDAHo CoDE ANN. § 18-101 (1947) ; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 610.02(1)

(1945);
(1959)'1

NEV.

REv.

STAT.

§ 193.010(14) (1961); N.D.

CE=r. CODE ANN.

§ 12-01-04(2)

5. "Negligent conduct may be either: (a) an act which the actor as a reasonable
man should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an
interest of another, or (b) failure to do an act which is necessary for the protection or
assistance of another and which the actor is under a duty to do." RE TATEmENT, TORTS
§ 284 (1934).
6. See MPC § 2.02(3).
7. MPC § 210.4.
8. MPC § 211.1 (1) (b).
9. MPC § 220.3(1), (2).
10. In addition to those offenses mentioned, a criminal prosecution may be maintained for strict liability offenses-considered noncriminal violations in the Code-in
which negligence will suffice to establish "culpability." See MPC § 2.05 (2) (b).
The Code further provides that a defendant charged with a crime as to which
negligence suffices to establish "culpability" may be deprived of an otherwise valid
defense when his alleged justifiable conduct was occasioned by his lack of due care.
For example, a defendant who would ordinarily be exculpated upon proof that he sought
to avoid more serious harm loses the defense when the forced choice of evils results
from his negligence in creating the situation or appraising the necessity of his conduct.
MPC § 3.02(2). Similarly, the defense of duress cannot be successfully claimed by the
actor whose dilemma was caused by his prior negligence. MPC § 2.09(2). Finally, the
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II. THE IMPORTANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN NEGLIGENT BEHAVIOR
AND VOLUNTARY HARM-DOING

It should from the outset be borne in mind that negligent behavior implies
inadvertence and must therefore be sharply distinguished from voluntary
harm-doing, i.e. from conduct that includes at least an awareness of possible
harm. If, for example, one who is about to drive an automobile knows that he
is ill or very tired or if he drinks alcoholic beverage knowing this will
incapacitate him, subsequent damage may justifiably be attributed to the
immediately prior conduct. Taking all the directly relevant facts into
account, it is tenable, though far from self-evident, to hold that he was
reckless, not merely negligent. This would seem to fall within the Model Penal
Code's definition of recklessness as conscious disregard for "a substantial
and unjustifiable risk.""- So, too, a railroad guard, who knows he has not
read recently issued regulations concerning his work, acts recklessly when
he controls the traffic despite his known ignorance. 12 With respect to negligent
damage, however, neither at the time of the damage nor shortly prior to it,
i.e., the time immediately related to the dangerous behavior in issue, does
the defendant have knowledge, belief, or suspicion that he is endangering anything socially valued. The vast difference between voluntary harm-doing
and negligent damage was expressed in Mr. Justice Holmes's graphic terms
that even a dog understands the difference between being kicked and being
stumbled over.
III.

THE HISTORICAL TREND TOWARD EXCLUDING NEGLIGENCE FROM
PENAL LIABILITY

The reasons in support of the position urged here, that negligence should
be excluded from the scope of penal liability, are ethical, scientific, and
historical. The historical ground rests upon the progressive restriction of the
range of negligence in penal law in many, perhaps all, modern legal systems
during the past millenium. This trend has gone very far in Anglo-American
law; for example, today it is well established in the common law of most of
these jurisdictions that conviction for manslaughter, including homicide by
automobile, requires at least recklessness. Indeed, a well known English
scholar has stated: "it should now be recognized that at common law there
is no criminal liability for harm thus caused by inadvertence."' 13 The extent
actor cannot claim the defense of justifiable force when his belief in its necessity was
negligently held or when he used otherwise allowable retaliation in a negligent manner
toward third persons. MPC § 3.09(2), (3). For criticism of these positions see HALL, op.
cit. supra note 2.

11. MPC § 2.02(2) (c).
12. Cf. MPC § 2.01, comment 2 at 120 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), quoted in note 2
supra.
13. TURNER, KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 34

(1962).
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to which this has been carried in England is illustrated by a decision reversing
the conviction of a doctor whose negligent treatment caused the death of ten
children .

4

It must be granted, however, that negligence persists in statutes and in
various corners of the Anglo-American criminal case law. Unfortunately, although the vast majority of states in the United States require that the actor's
"negligence" be "criminal,"' 1 "culpable,"' 1 or "gross,"' 7 the uncertainty of
these terms and the confusion of the "external" standard of the "reasonable
man" employed in the method of proof with the standard of liability required by
liens rea have given rise to decisions of very dubious validity.' 8 At the same
time, it must also be recognized that in the civil law code systems, negligence
is not criminally punishable absent a specific provision to that effect, and
such provisions are very few.
History is often a dubious ground upon which to support a thesis. But
when there has been a long and sustained movement in many legal systems,
such as the progressive narrowing of negligence in penal law, and this
long course of history represents the efforts of many thoughtful lawyers, the
significance of such historical evidence should not be ignored. Instead, it should
place the burden upon the proponents of penalization of negligent behavior to
prove that their opinion is sounder than the preponderant view of the judges
expressed in the common law on this subject, especially in this century.

IV. THE ETHICAL REASONS

FOR EXCLUDING NEGLIGENCE

The main issues in the current polemics are ethical ones. People differ
regarding many ethical questions; therefore, all the more significant is the
enduring agreement in the long history of ethics that vohntary harm-doing
is the essence of fault.' 9 Accordingly, the proposal to exclude negligence
14. Akerele v. The King, [19431 A.C. 255 (P.C. 1942) (W. Afr.).
15. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-131 (1956) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-114 (1947);

NEv. REV. STAT. § 193.190 (1961).
16. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 619.18(3) (Supp. 1961); N.Y. PEN. LAW
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-27-19 (1959).
17. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 192.
18. Cf. HALL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 227-28, 232-33.

§ 1052(3);

19. In his essay, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility, Professor H. L.
A. Hart criticizes Dr. J. W. C. Turner for holding that "unless a man 'has in his
mind the idea of harm to someone,'" it is "bad law" and "morally objectionable . . .to
punish him." OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 29, 42 (Guest ed. 1961). In fact, Dr.
Turner also requires that there be voluntary conduct. Again, Professor Hart equates
forgetting and inadvertence with decision, id. at 44, and he does not consider the relevant
action, the manifested effort, which is basic in law. An assumption of determinism is
applied indiscriminately in disregard of everyday experience that there is a crucial
difference between thoughts that come and go and (voluntary) conduct. Obviously, it is
possible to say that everything is determined, but, on that premise, there is no point in
any discussion since that, too, is determined.
Professor Hart concentrates on capacity, especially on the capacity to take due care,
and he criticizes various writers on the dubious assumption that they do not recognize
its importance. Here, again, induced perhaps by interpretations of mens rea in solely
cognitive terms, is the failure to recognize that not only capacity but also (voluntary)
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from penal liability is far from being a radical innovation.2 0 That choice, and
therefore (voluntary) action, are the sine qua non of fault was expounded
by Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and many succeeding philosophers. Most
of the current polemics directly or covertly recognize that principle.
The requirement of (voluntary) action becomes even more persuasive in
penal law. For, certainly among moralists, punishing a human being is a very
serious matter. No one should be punished unless he has clearly acted immorally, i.e., voluntarily harmed someone, and unless a criminal sanction is
both suitable and effective. The implication is that if there is any doubt
regarding any of the relevant criteria-voluntariness and the suitability and
effectiveness of punishment-the issue should be resolved by narrowing penal
liability. In terms of current polemics, the question is this: even assuming
that in a wide sense of "fault" a negligent harm-doer is culpable, should not
serious doubts regarding the degree of his culpability be resolved, contrary to
the Model Penal Code's provision, by narrowing punishable guilt to voluntary
harm-doing?
Aristotle held consistently to his view of volition as the ground of culpability when he disapproved an act done in ignorance or in a state of intoxication if that condition was the result of past voluntary misconduct.2 1 But
Aristotle nowhere suggested that this phase of his theory of fault should be
applied to legal liability. When that question is faced, at least two serious problems are met, the first of which challenges Aristotle's assumption; namely, are
the misdeeds of childhood and youth the "substantial cause" of the subsequent
negligence that is immediately in issue? And second, even if such a causal
connection is assumed, how can a suitable penalty be fixed on that basis?
In other terms, granted the large element of tradition and chance in current
scales of punishment for voluntary crimes, does not the attribution of
negligence to preceding voluntary wrongdoing raise additional, practically
insoluble, difficulties due to the impossibility of appraising the subjective
element in that view of negligent damage?
Moreover, since Aristotle's time, the findings of psychology, both individual and social, have contributed much to our knowledge of human
personality. The growth and formation of personality from infancy onward,
in the family and other primary groups, is not now considered to be a matter
of individual control. Even if one is skeptical of psychiatric theories of the
enduring, pervasive effect of the conditions of infancy, one may doubt
action is important in criminal law. Since such action includes or presupposes normal
capacity, concentration on capacity is irrelevant to the insistence on action as the condition
of just, legal punishment.

20. Among the German and Swiss writers who have advocated this are von Buri,
Galliner, Kohlrausch, Radbruch, and Germann.

21. See ARIsToTLE, ETHcA NiCErOmAcHEA bk. III, 5, 1113b-1114a; bk. V, 8, ll3ba,
5-10 (Ross transl. 1925); ARISTOTLE, MAGNA MORALIA bk. I, 33, 1195a, 28-32 (Ross
transl. 1915). See also HAL, op. cit. .rupra note 2, at 113-39, 368-72.

NEGLIGENT BEHAVIOR

1963]

whether the failure to acquire normal skill is a moral fault with which criminal
law may be properly concerned. There is, of course, an element of conditioning
in much voluntary harm-doing. But a crucial difference remains in the
extremely important degree of individual freedom, autonomy, and awareness
which are expressed in (voluntary) action by a normal adult. Even if it is
believed that sensitivity to moral duties is definitely related, as a by-product,
to good deeds, the process of such character development is too intricate to
be influenced by the simple controls prescribed in penal law; and the evaluation of the fault ("guilt") thus attributed to negligently caused damage lies
beyond the legislative competence, at least as represented in the current codes.
Indeed, it may be doubted whether it is within any human competence to
appraise this sort of assumed immorality-the accumulation of countless
faults from childhood to the instant damage-in quantitative terms of specific
penalties.
Whereas Aristotle was quite consistent in resting moral disapproval
upon (voluntary) action, some modern writers, although they seem to
recognize the validity of this position, do not actually adhere to it. Two
principal ethical arguments are offered in support of the punishment of
inadvertent harm-doing. The first states that negligent harm-doers exhibit
such an indifference to social values, such a calloused character, that they
deserve punishment.2 But this expands the meaning of "fault" to include
ignorance and insensitivity. Although these characteristics are to be deplored,
they do not amount to voluntary harm-doing. Such an insensitive person is
by definition not aware of his dangerous behavior. Calloused character cannot
be identified or equated with voluntary misconduct. Moreover, negligently
caused damage, unlike voluntary harm-doing, does not challenge the community's values as expressed in the penal law.
For these reasons, it is not tenable to argue that in certain dangerous
situations one who knowingly increases the risk should be held no more
culpable than one who inadvertently does so. Such general assertions overlook
the fact that the standard of due care must be determined by reference to the
various actual situations, and that it is the unjustifiable increase in the risk,
determined in relation to the relevant situation and standard, that is
pertinent. Accordingly, one must always ask whether the actor knew he was
creating an unwarranted, unreasonable risk. If he knew he was unjustifiably
increasing the risk, the fact that he thought he would not actually harm anyone
does not exculpate him, although he is less culpable than one who was indifferent to possible harm.
The other prevailing ethical argument in support of the punishment of
negligent damage runs as follows:
22. See

HALL,

op. cit. mipra note 2, at 135-36.
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There is a moral duty to take care not to harm social values.
One who violates this duty deserves punishment.
A negligent harm-doer has violated this duty.
Therefore, he merits punishment.

With deference to the distinguished proponents of this view, it is
respectfully submitted that it will not survive critical analysis. First, one
may grant the above major premise (1 supra) especially if one notes the
ambiguity of the term "moral" and bears in mind the distinction, emphasized
by Hartmann, between moral and situational values.23 But much more important is that acceptance of the above major premise does not require agreement with conclusions 2, 3, and 4. Premise 2 would include violators of
contracts and of insignificant duties; and it does not help to qualify premise 2
by "illegality" since this merely supplies a formal criterion. The fact that a
code or statute imposes punishment rather than another kind of sanction is
no substantive support of the above thesis.
Second, instead of indulging in assumptions, one should face the
questions: what does it mean to "violate" a moral duty, and what degree
of violation is required to justify the punishment of human beings? The term
"violate" is ambiguous in the precise regard that forms the moot issue.
"Violate," in a moral context, cannot mean merely that a disvalue has been
caused in the sense of physical causation. Granted that there is a duty to take
care not to injure social values, it should not be assumed that any behavior
that damages social values is a violation of that duty. As to negligence,
different answers are given in the tort law and criminal law of different
systems. This raises the problem to be solved. In sum, the proponents of the
above thesis should articulate the reasons for holding that a violation of a
moral duty, not merely a situational disvalue, has occurred when damage is
caused negligently. Careful attention should be given to the precise nature
of the alleged fault in negligent damage. And, it should be asked, why is
punishment rather than civil liability or some other nonpunitive sanction
deserved in such cases?
It is often assumed that the negligent person violated a moral duty
because he "could have" acted carefully and thus conformed to his duty. The
Model Penal Code holds a person culpable when he "should be aware" of a
substantial risk, 24 but the problems noted above are not discussed. In either
formulation, there is a gap in the argument that if a person has the capacity,
for example, to drive an automobile carefully and he drives it negligently, he
is morally culpable. The basis of culpability cannot in this view be any voluntary
action or forbearance. What, then, is the link between normal competence
HARTMANN, ETHICS (Coit transl. 1932).
24. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.

23. See
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and inadvertent damage which supports a judgment of moral culpability?
Next, one may normally have sufficient capacity, but on the occasion in issue
one may have been tired, worried, excited, and so on. Serious accidents are rare
in most persons' experience and the element of chance determining inadvertent
damage is large. What, then, is the justification for imposing a punitive
legal sanction? Again, suppose a person is unable to use due care, e.g., in
driving an automobile, although, as is apt to be the case, he thinks he has
the required capacity. What is the basis for criminal liability for negligent
damage by such a person?
Sometimes it is implied or suggested that just prior to the damage, the
actor diverted his attention from the risk of his behavior. But the fact is
that what he did at that time was either voluntary, i.e. intentional or reckless,
or it was not voluntary. If (voluntary) conduct is meant, then negligent
inadvertence, as the ground of liability, has been abandoned unless there is also
an implied reliance upon Aristotle's thesis that an act done in ignorance may
be the result of long past voluntary misconduct. This, as has been suggested,
must be rejected when applied to penal law because it cannot be shown that
negligence is a condition voluntarily produced and, even if the contrary be
assumed, no rational basis supports determining a penalty for present negligent
damage attributed to voluntary wrongs committed in the distant past, perhaps
in the course of a whole lifetime.
So, too, the assertion that negligent damage and reckless harm-doing are
alike because both involve dangerous behavior and because both violate the
law and morality assumes the moot issue-should not the two be sharply
distinguished? It obscures the fact that they are utterly different in the
crucial criterion of volition and, in effect, abandons the traditional ground that
fault rests on voluntary harm-doing. In sum, the fact that inadvertence is not
advertence is inescapable. The two, like life and death, are mutually exclusive.
In recent writing on this subject, psychological notions about "unconscious
willing" are sometimes advanced as the basis of penal liability. As to such
interpretations, it need only be stated: first, that this psychological theory
is far from being well established in critical circles; and second, even if it
is assumed that this theory is valid, it has only the remotest relevance to the
(conscious) action that is the sine qua non of just punishment. To open the
Pandora's box of modern psychiatry, which delves principally into the
unconscious aspects of human nature, is to obscure the central issue and to
abandon completely the essential criterion of the morality of penal law.
This applies also to the fine-spun theory that in any action, as for example,
driving an automobile, stimuli are sent to the driver and he attends to them
even if he ignores them. For the plain fact is that in the situation under
consideration, either the driver did not receive the normal stimuli or he
inadvertently failed to guide his conduct in conformity with them. The
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relevant concern is not with one who drives an automobile while attending
to the possible danger, but, instead, is with the driver who is inadvertent, i.e.,
insensitive to the danger of his behavior.
A person either has that sensitivity or he lacks it. If he had normal
sensitivity, presumably he would have expressed it in taking due care,
especially because a collision also endangers his own life. If he lacks that
sensitivity, he may be careless. To declare that a person had the competence
to be sensitive to ordinary dangers is a tautology, since competence is or
includes that sensitivity. In other terms, is one to be blamed because one is
not normally sensitive to ordinary danger or to a duty to attend to such
danger? This statement of the issue, in terms relevant to penal liability,
also reveals the superficiality of determining this difficult factual problem in
a courtroom. For, as regards the determination of sensitivity to social values
and the possibility of danger, a quick glance at the education, vocation, and
mentality of the negligent person leads only to guesswork.2 5 The result is
strict penal liability, not punishment based on fault.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in support of the view that
negligent damage involves a moral fault is based on the familiar fact that
many, perhaps most, persons suffer from self-reproach after a damage has
occurred in which they played some necessary part. That we refer to such
experience as "pangs of conscience" or "remorse" should not obscure the fact
that the much more important function of conscience is prescience, i.e. foreknowledge, guidance toward good ends and away from bad ones. When there
is only post-knowledge, there may be regret at causing a disvalue, in a physical
sense of "causation," but that is not the kind of reproach or remorse that follows
the realization of having voluntarily harmed someone.
Everyone has sometime experienced self-reproach after a faux pas,
a thoughtless remark that hurt someone's feelings, a deed carelessly omitted
that should have been done, and so on. In some instances, such self-reproach
for inadvertent damage is a result of past conditioning and, also, the recognition of social values. That one may concede a duty to compensate or even
believe he deserves to be punished is often an emotional attitude reflecting
this conditioning or tardy awareness of values, but it does not always or
necessarily signify moral culpability. There are values to be created and
disvalues to be avoided, and one is more or less aware of an almost normal
falling short of his full potentialities in this regard. But morality, in the
sense recognized almost throughout modern penal law, is restricted to action,
25. The Code drafters state that the criterion of negligence is deprived "of all its
objectivity" if consideration is given to the actor's heredity, intelligence, or temperament.
MPC § 2.02, comment 3 at 126 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). But they do not consider the
justice of punishment imposed on a strictly external (objective) standard, and it is at
least arguable that valid decisions can be based on knowledge of individual (subjective)
characteristics.
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i.e., to manifested effort. The fact that only certain disvalues are specified in
criminal codes penalizing negligence does not alter the quality of such
behavior. Instead, it raises questions of consistency and the survival of emotional
reactions, for example, against homicide and "assault" with a deadly weapon,
but not against other major harms.
Finally, the reason we reproach ourselves for damage caused when we
were not alert to possible danger is often an earlier, voluntary misdeed, e.g.,
drinking intoxicating liquor with the knowledge that this would affect our
subsequent behavior, driving an automobile when we knew we were ill or very
tired, and so on; our self-reproach does not focus upon our inadvertence
but goes beyond that to the real cause in the relevant, immediately prior,
voluntary misconduct.
In sum, although many persons are frequently blamed, this does not
warrant a leap from that commonplace fact to the conclusion that punishment
for negligence is justified. "Blame" is a very wide notion and, like praise, it
permeates almost all of daily life. Important differences exist between raising
an eyebrow and putting a man in jail, between blame for not developing
one's potentialities and blame for voluntarily harming a human being, between
blame that can be rejected or that leaves the censured person free to do as
he pleases and the blame signified in the inexorable imposition of a major
legal privation, and, finally, between the blame expressed in a judgment for
damages and the blame implied in punishing a criminal. 26
Some scholars who support the penalization of those who negligently
cause damage do so on the utilitarian ground of deterrence. But this position
encounters many difficulties, apart from the fact that deterrence culminates
in cruelty when it is most effective, or in inconsistency if it is tacitly subordinated to ethical concern. In any case, it must be asked of the Model
Penal Code draftsmen and other scholars who take their stand on deterrence:
why the slight penalty for negligent damage, found typically in modern codes
and in the Model Penal Code, since, presumably, the greater the penalty the
higher would be the deterrence? And next, why restrict penalization for
negligence to a few specified crimes; why not extend it generally?
The theory of deterrence rests on the premise of rational utility, i.e.
that prospective offenders will weigh the evil of the sanction against the gain
of the imagined crime. This, however, is not relevant to negligent harm-doers
since they have not in the least thought of their duty, their dangerous
behavior, or any sanction.2 7 Insofar as potential offenders do think of these
matters, they are at least reckless when they act dangerously.
26. Cf. Hart, supranote 19, at 44.

27. The draftsmen of the Code state: "Knowledge that conviction and sentence,
not to speak of punishment, may follow conduct that inadvertently creates improper risk
supplies men with an additional motive to take care before acting, to use their faculties
and draw on their experience in gauging the potentialities of contemplated conduct."
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It follows that a theory of deterrence must rest on the assumption that
punishment exercises an indirect influence or conditioning. It would still need
to be shown, however, why such conditioning is not effected by the punishment
of reckless harm-doers, i.e., why it is also necessary to punish for negligent
damage. In any event, no evidence whatever supports the assumption that,
in some mysterious way, insensitive negligent persons are improved or
deterred by their punishment or that of other negligent persons. Studies
of children made by educators point to an opposite conclusion. Moreover,
the discipline of children, if assumed to be effective, provides no apt analogy
because punishing an adult implies moral culpability on his part. Besides, the
disciplining of a child is a constant everyday matter. Is it, therefore, sound
to assume that mildly punishing a negligent adult two or three times in the
course of many years will have any favorable result? Punishment in such cases
may provide emotional satisfaction but there is no evidence to show, or reason
to think, that it is sufficiently related to the causes of inadvertence and
insensitivity to support the theory of deterrence.
V.

SCIENTIFIC GROUNDS FOR EXCLUDING NEGLIGENCE FROM

PENAL LIABILITY
Last, but certainly not least important, are the scientific grounds for
excluding negligence from penal liability. First are the inconsistencies resulting from the restriction of negligence to the currently specified crimes. A
person may negligently misrepresent facts, he may negligently take other
persons' property, or he may negligently enter a dwelling-house; and, indeed,
a vast array of damage indicated in most proscribed harms, if not all of them,
can be caused negligently. At the same time, the inconsistencies indicated
above cloud the social meaning of the current law of voluntary harm-doing.
Second, current discussions run into further inconsistencies in avowing
a teleological theory while, at the same time, insisting upon the inclusion of
negligence within the orbit of penal liability. But the distinctive essence of
negligence, it seems impossible to overemphasize, is inadvertence, precisely
nonpurposiveness.
Third, the notion of fault becomes a vague congeries of diverse elements
since inadvertent damage is assumed to be of the same genus as voluntary
harm-doing. This results in formalism and injustice.
Fourth, the inclusion of negligence in penal law imposes an impossible
function on the judges, namely, to determine whether a person, about whom
very little is known, had the competence (sensitivity) to appreciate certain
MPC § 2.02, comment 3 at 126-27 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). But "motive," in its usual

sense, is a reason or ground, i.e., a consciously held basis for (voluntary) action. It
is precisely this which is lacking in inadvertent behavior, although, presumably, all normal
adults have the above knowledge. If the question of fact cannot be determined, the
issue should be resolved by restricting criminal liability.
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duties and dangers in a particular situation-when the facts plainly indicate
28
that he did not exhibit that competence.
Finally, and most serious of all from the viewpoint of maximizing
knowledge of criminal law, the inclusion of negligence bars the discovery
of a scientific theory of penal law, i.e., a system of propositions interrelating
29
variables that have a realistic foundation in fact and values.
In sum, the exclusion of negligence from penal liability is based on the
great difference between consciousness and unawareness, between action or
conduct and mere behavior. It is in accord with the most enduring truth
in the history of ethics-that voluntary conduct is the essential condition of
disapproval and, certainly, of legally sanctioned punishment. Hence, too, the
application of this perennial principle to penal law would be more humane
than the approach of the Model Penal Code. By the same token, it would
clarify in the public mind the vast difference between voluntary harm-doing
and inadvertent damage. It seems likely also that the narrowing of penal law
to genuine crimes will make the punitive sanction more effective within the
restricted sphere of its operation. Thus, the exclusion of negligence from
penal liability would further consistency, avoid formalism and injustice, and
remove the greatest bar to the discovery of a realistic, scientific theory of
criminal law.
VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

If the above analysis is sound, the correct implication is not that
nothing should be done about negligently caused damage, but, instead, that
punishment it not a fit instrument. It is evident that the community should
protect itself against damage caused by lack of skill, inadvertence, and
insensitivity. But the first step toward effective legal control is the recognition
of the actual nature of the problem.
The following are suggested as meriting consideration in this connection:
1. The complete escape of negligent persons from any civil liability
via insurance should be re-examined; as between the insurance company
and the negligent insured, the latter should be compelled to pay at least part
of the damage, and this might take the form of increased insurance rates. As
to uninsured negligent persons, the possibility of devising feasible methods
of enforcing compensation should be explored.
2. The control of licenses should be more rigorous, first, to exclude
persons who are not qualified to operate dangerous instrumentalities or to
28. Cf. MPC § 2.02, comment 3 at 126 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (admission by
Code draftsmen that the definition of negligence, see text accompanying note 3 srupra, is
a "tautological articulation of the final question" under which "the tribunal must evaluate
the actor's failure of perception and determine whether, under all the circumstances, it

,was serious enough to be condemned.").

29. See HALL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14-26; Hall, The Scientific and Humane Study
of Criminal Law, 42 B.U.L. REv. 267 (1962).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
engage in certain vocations and, second, to suspend or revoke licenses when
adverse personality traits are discovered. This implies a consideration of
psychical as well as physical faculties not only in the grant but also, and
especially, in the suspension or revocation of licenses.
3. A vast improvement in administration has made available concrete
possibilities for education and instruction. Resort to the courts is no longer
the only approach to the solution of this problem.
4. Finally, the institutions and influences in social life that form
sensitive, normal personality should be improved and helped to provide the
psychological and ethical conditions that are conducive to the desired end.
This is the most difficult of all reforms. But a difficult problem calls especially for measures that take due account of the actual, relevant behavior and
its underlying causes.
The likelihood is that the proposed methods would be much more effective
than punishment because they would come to grips with the actual problem
of negligent damage. But even if one is dubious about the suggested measures
for dealing with such negligence, still, it does not follow that punishment is
necessary or helpful. Moreover, punishmeht, if it is ethically defensible, must
rest not upon the deficiencies of alternative methods, but on its own positive
grounds. When punishment sanctioned by law is not justifiable, the significance of just punishment is dissipated and the public is confused regarding
criminal conduct. It is regrettable that the Model Penal Code has obscured
and weakened the central thrust of the common law of crimes by perpetuating
the vestiges of penalization for negligent behavior.

